RESOLUTION
In matters of the complainants (a) TommyHilfiger Licensing LLC,with its seat at 10001 New York, 601 W. 26th St., 6th Floor, United States of America, (b) Urban Trends Trading B.V.,with its seat at Utrecht, NL-3543 AP, Krommewetering 41, Netherlands, (c) RADO Uhren AG,with its seat at CH-2543 Lengnau BE, Bielstrasse 45, Switzerland, (d) Facton Kft.,with its seat at Budapest 1052, Apáczai Csere János utca 11, Hungary, (e) Lacoste S.A.,with its seat at Paris 75001, 8 rue de Castiglione, France, (f) Burberry Limited,with its seat at London EC4 A3TW, Horseferry House, Horseferry Road, United Kingdom, all represented by JUDr. Ludmila Neustupná, CSc., advokátka (attorney-at-law) with her office at 110 00 Prague 1, Revolucní 763/15, versus the defendant DELTA CENTER a.s., with its seat at 170 04 Prague 7 - Holešovice, Bubenské nábreží 306, ID No. 45148007, represented by JUDr. Jan Lukeš, advokát (attorney-at-law) with his office at 110 00 Prague 1, Hybernská 1007/20, on the protection of industrial property rights and the protection of the established goodwill of a legal person, heard in proceedings before the Prague Municipal Court under case file No. 2 Cm 98/2010, the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic, acting through a senate composed of presiding justice JUDr. Zdeňek Des and justices JUDr. Kateřina Hornochová and JUDr. Ing. Pavel Horák, Ph.D., has decided on the appeal on a point of law by the complainants against judgment 3 Cmo 155/2012-166 of the Prague Upper Court of 5 December 2012 as follows:
I. Proceedings shall be stayed until the Court of Justice of the European Union has handed down a preliminary ruling on the points of law referred to it in operative part II of this resolution.
II. Based on Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Czech Supreme Court asks the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling on the following prejudicial questions:
Does a person who rents out a market square and makes available individual stalls to market vendors (as well as parcels of land on which such stalls may be erected) for their purposes qualify as an intermediary whose services are used by third parties to infringe intellectual property rights within the meaning of Article 11 of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004, on the enforcement of intellectual property rights?
May measures be imposed within the meaning of Article 11 of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004, on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, against a person who rents out a market square and makes available individual stalls to market vendors (as well as parcels of land on which such stalls may be erected) for their purposes, on the same terms as those which the Court of Justice of the European Union established for the issuance of injunctions against the operators of on-line marketplaces in ECJ judgment C-324/09 of 12 July 2011 in C-324/09 L’Oréal and other decisions against e-Bay and others?
Reasons:
I. Proceedings before the court of first instance
(1) In its judgment 2 Cm 98/2010-114 of 28 February 2012, the Prague Municipal Court dismissed the claim of all Complainants which sought an injunction requiring the Defendant to refrain from entering into, or extending, sublease agreements on the use of premises and retail space within the boundaries of what is known as "Prague Market Halls" (Pražská tržnice) in Prague 7 - Holešovice, Bubenské nábřeží 306, with subjects who, according to non-appealable decisions by courts or administrative authorities, infringed or compromised the rights to the trademarks listed below, or with subjects who, as of the moment of the non-appealable decision on provable infringement or compromising of rights to the trademarks listed below, used the premises or retail space on or in which the rights to trademarks held by the Complainants were infringed or compromised (as per statement I of the operative part of the judgment). The court further dismissed the claim of all Complainants which sought an injunction requiring the Defendant to refrain from entering into, or extending, sublease agreements on the use of premises and retail space within the boundaries of what is known as "Prague Market Halls" (Pražská tržnice) in Prague 7 - Holešovice, Bubenské nábřeží 306, unless these agreements were to contain an undertaking on the part of the sublessee to refrain from the infringement of the Complainants' industrial property rights and unless these agreements were to stipulate that the sublessor (tenant) may cancel the agreement, giving no more than 14 days' notice, on grounds of the infringement or compromising of rights to the Complainants' trademarks (as specified in operative part of the judgment) on the premises or in the retail space used by the sublessee (as per statement II of the operative part of the judgment). Further, the court dismissed the claim of all Complainants which sought an injunction requiring the Defendant to refrain from continuing Defendant's sublease relationship with subjects who, according to non-appealable decisions by courts or administrative authorities, infringed or compromised the rights to the trademarks specified in the operative part of the judgment, or with subjects who, as of the moment of the non-appealable decision on provable infringement or compromising of rights to such trademarks, used the premises or retail space on or in which the rights to these trademarks specified in the operative part of the judgment were infringed or compromised (as per statement III of the operative part of the judgment). The court also dismissed the claim which sought an injunction requiring Defendant to send a letter of apology to the Complainants within seven days from the day on which the judgment sought would become final and to publish, at Defendant's cost, a public statement in the periodical Hospodářské noviny within three months from the day on which the judgment sought would become final, whereas the said public statement should occupy at least one half page, be bordered by a frame, be lettered in a font of at least 12pt size, and have the wording specified in the operative part of the judgment (as per statement IV of the operative part of the judgment). The court further dismissed the claim which sought an injunction requiring the Defendant to publish the text of the operative part of the judgment sought, at Defendant's cost, in the periodical Hospodářské noviny, published by Economia a.s., within three months from the day on which the judgment would become final, whereas this text should occupy at least one half page, be bordered by a frame, and be lettered in a font of at least 12pt size (statement V of the operative part of the judgment). Finally, the court also ruled on the costs of proceedings (as per statement VI of the operative part of the judgment).
(2) The first-instance court established that the Defendant is the tenant of the "Prague Market Halls", a marketplace in Prague – Holešovice, and that it rents out the sales premises to individual vendors in the form of subletting. Goods which infringe on the Complainants' IP rights were repeatedly sold in this marketplace in the past. Based on a template for the agreement on the lease of a sales stall ("Trhovec"), the court established that the agreement obliges tenants (sublessees) to observe the generally binding provisions of statutory law in all their activities. A flyer entitled "Notice to Vendors" contains an instruction in Czech and Vietnamese, drawing attention to the fact that the sale of counterfeit goods constitutes an infringement of intellectual property rights, and that the operator of the marketplace, with a view to the results of inspections by the customs authorities, reminds all vendors on the premises of the Prague Market Halls of the ban on sales of counterfeit goods of any producer whose brand is protected by copyright, and that a violation of this ban triggers not only criminal liability but is also grounds to terminate the agreement.
(3) In legal terms, the court found that making a sales booth, vendor stall, or retail premises available on the basis of subletting may be considered, within the meaning of Sec. 4 (3) of Act No. 221/2006 Coll., on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (the "IP Rights Enforcement Act"), the provision of means used by third parties for the infringement of rights - i.e., in the case at hand, by selling counterfeit goods. With respect to the Complainants' request that obligations be imposed as to the contents of agreements with vendors, the first-instance court found that such a claim is at odds with the scope of remedial measures provided in Sec. 4 IP Rights Enforcement Act. With respect to the Complainant's' request on grounds of the protection of goodwill, the court arrived at the conclusion that the reputation of the Complainants cannot have been infringed insofar it must be obvious to buyers, with a view to the circumstances, that the goods sold at the marketplace are counterfeit, and are not in fact products of the Complainants.
II. Proceedings before the court of appeals
(4) The Prague Upper Court ruled on the appeal of the Complainants in judgment 3 Cmo 155/2012-166 of 5 December 2012, in which it upheld the judgment of the first instance court and decided on the costs of proceedings.
(5) The court of appeals based its deliberations on the same factual state of affairs as the first-instance court. In legal terms, it found that it was of key importance to determine whether or not the Defendant is an "intermediary" within the meaning of Sec. 4 (3) of the IP Rights Enforcement Act. With a view to Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004, on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (the "Directive"), which was transposed into Czech law by way of Act No. 221/2006, Coll., on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (its preamble and Article 10), the court of appeals arrived at the conclusion that there must exist a direct connection between the means or service rendered to the infringer and the infringement of third-party rights. Making available sales premises for use by others is a common service whose nature does not suggest that it is being rendered so that others may infringe third-party rights. It is inconceivable that making available retail premises facilitates the infringement of rights of the Complainants. Endorsing the opposite interpretation would in the view of the court of appeals lend credence to absurd conclusions, such as concluding that the supply of electricity or the issuance of a trade license to specific vendors would likewise have to be considered a "means allowing the infringement of rights". The court of appeals refused to apply the findings of the European Court of Justice ("ECJ", now the Court of Justice of the European Union - hereinafter also "CJEU" or "Court of Justice") of 12 July 2011 in C-324/09, arguing that they did apply to internet marketplaces.
(6) In terms of the infringement of goodwill, the court found that – given that the Defendant does not allow the sale of counterfeit goods on the premises of the marketplace – the Defendant is not guilty of any activities that would infringe on the good reputation of the Complainants, so that a lawsuit on grounds of the protection of their goodwill has no merit.
III. Appeal on a point of law
(7) All Complainants filed an appeal on a point of law against the judgment of the court of appeals, whereas they believe such higher-level appeal to be allowable under Sec. 237 (1) (a) of Act No. 99/1963 Coll., the Code of Civil Procedure, in that they are of the opinion that the court of appeals, while upholding the first-instance court's judgment, did so on entirely different grounds and thus de facto changed the first-instance court's judgment. The Complainants refer to judgment 29 Odo 224/2001 of the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic (the "Supreme Court"). The Complainants also base the allowability of their higher-level appeal on Sec. 237 (1) (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, in that they believe that reviewing the said point of law is of fundamental legal relevance given that the case law of the court of appeals never before resolved on the issue whether the operator of a (physical, as opposed to electronic) marketplace may be considered a person whose means or services are used by third parties for the infringement of intellectual property rights within the meaning of Sec. 4 (3) of Act No. 221/2006 Coll., and whether an injunction may be issued against such marketplace operator pursuant to Sec. 4 (1) of the cited Act.
(8) As for the merit of their appeal on a point of law, the Complainants believe that the challenged decision of the court of appeals rests on a faulty legal assessment of the matter. According to the Complainants, the court of appeals should not have taken as its point of departure Article 10 of the Directive, but rather Article 11. The term "intermediary" as understood by the Directive must be construed broadly, without taking into consideration culpability or liability of the said intermediaries for the infringement of intellectual property rights. In this respect, the Complainants refer to an analysis of the application of the Directive of 22 October 2010 and to the CJEU (ECJ) judgment of 12 July 2011 in C-324/09. The Complainants are of the view that there is no difference between online marketplaces and the Defendant's physical marketplace. The condition of a "direct connection" between the means or services on the one hand and the infringement on the other hand does not follow from case law. The Complainants agree that each case must be reviewed individually, taking into account its specific nature, which may well mean that an electricity provider (utility company) is not necessarily an intermediary within the meaning of the Directive. However, the Defendant is in a much closer relation to the vendors. The court of appeals has not substantiated what difference there should be between an electronic marketplace and a "real" (physical) marketplace. In the view of the Complainants, their own conclusion as to whether recourse to the marketplace operator is possible is supported also by the explanatory memorandum on the IP Rights Enforcement Act. The Complainants therefore believe that the court should have accommodated the relief sought in statements (I) through (III) of their lawsuit.
(9) As for the supposed infringement of the good reputation (goodwill) of legal entities (i.e., the Claimants), the Complainants state that the first-instance court failed to properly address the relief sought in this respect. Contra the court of appeals, the Complainants believe that the Defendant facilitated the sale of counterfeit goods and thus allowed for the impression to take hold and spread that the Complainants produce products of poor quality.
IV. Allowability of appeal on a point of law
(10) On an introductory note, the Supreme Court as the appellate court for appeals on a point of law (Sec. 10a of the Code of Civil Procedure) holds that the authoritative wording of the Code of Civil Procedure for appellate proceedings (until 31 December 2012) follows from item 7 Article II Part One of Act No. 404/2012 Coll., amending Act No. 99/1963 Coll., the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, and certain other laws.
(11) After satisfying itself of the fact that the higher-level appeal against the judgment of the court of appeals was filed within the time limit set out in Sec. 240 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, and by persons of standing, and in observance of the requirements as to its mandatory contents, the Supreme Court first addressed the issue whether an appeal on a point of law is allowable, for only based upon an allowable appeal on a point of law may a challenged decision be reviewed, under the aspect of the grounds for an appeal on a point of law invoked in the said appeal.
(12) The Supreme Court found that the higher-level appeal is allowable pursuant to Sec. 237 (1) (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, because the appellate court has never before addressed the question whether the operator of a (physical, as opposed to electronic) marketplace may be a person whose means or services are used by third parties to infringe intellectual property rights within the meaning of Sec. 4 (3) of Act No. 221/2006 Coll., and whether measures may be imposed unto such marketplace operator pursuant to Sec. 4 (1) of the cited Act.
V. Statutory framework and justification for the reference for a preliminary ruling
(13) Pursuant to Sec. 4 (1) of Act No. 221/2006 Coll., on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (hereinafter again the "IP Rights Enforcement Act"), an unlawful infringement of rights entitles the injured party to seek an injunction in court so that the infringer desist from their actions by which the erstwhile party's rights are infringed or jeopardized, and that the consequences of such jeopardy or infringement are removed, i.e., in particular,
a) recalling products from circulation whose manufacturing or bringing into circulation or storage caused the imperilment or infringement of rights,
b) permanent removal or destruction of products whose manufacturing or bringing into circulation or storage caused the imperilment or infringement of rights,
c) recalling from circulation, permanently removing, or destroying material, tools, and equipment that are exclusively or primarily designated or used for activities which infringe or jeopardize rights.
(14) According to paragraph (3) of Sec. 4, the injured party may seek the court enforcement of its claims set out in paragraph (1) also vis-a-vis anyone whose means or services are used by third persons for the infringement.
(15) In applying Sec. 4 of the IP Rights Enforcement Act, one must take into account Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004, on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (hereinafter again the "Directive") which the IP Rights Enforcement Act transposes into national law (Sec. 1 of the IP Rights Enforcement Act) – whereas national law must to the greatest possible extent be interpreted in the light of the wording and purpose of the Directive in order to achieve the result pursued by the Directive (indirect effect) (see the two ECJ judgments cited by the Complainants: ECJ judgment of 13 November 1990 in C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internationale de Alimentacion SA and ECJ judgment of 10 April 1984 in C-14/83, Von Colson).
(16) According to recital (17) of the preamble of the Directive, The measures, procedures and remedies provided for in this Directive should be determined in each case in such a manner as to take due account of the specific characteristics of that case, including the specific features of each intellectual property right and, where appropriate, the intentional or unintentional character of the infringement.
(17) According to recital (23) of the preamble of the Directive, without prejudice to any other measures, procedures and remedies available, rightholders should have the possibility of applying for an injunction against an intermediary whose services are being used by a third party to infringe the rightholder's industrial property right. The conditions and procedures relating to such injunctions should be left to the national law of the member states. As far as infringements of copyright and related rights are concerned, a comprehensive level of harmonisation is already provided for in Directive 2001/29/EC. Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29/EC should therefore not be affected by this Directive.
(18) According to recital (24) of the preamble of the Directive, depending on the particular case, and if justified by the circumstances, the measures, procedures and remedies to be provided for should include prohibitory measures aimed at preventing further infringements of intellectual property rights. Moreover there should be corrective measures, where appropriate at the expense of the infringer, such as the recall and definitive removal from the channels of commerce, or destruction, of the infringing goods and, in appropriate cases, of the materials and implements principally used in the creation or manufacture of these goods. These corrective measures should take account of the interests of third parties including, in particular, consumers and private parties acting in good faith.
(19) According to Article 3 (1) of the Directive, member states shall provide for the measures, procedures and remedies necessary to ensure the enforcement of the intellectual property rights covered by this Directive. Those measures, procedures and remedies shall be fair and equitable and shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delay.
(20) According to paragraph (2) of Article 3 of the Directive, those measures, procedures and remedies shall also be effective, proportionate and dissuasive and shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.
(21) According to paragraph (1) of Article 10 ("Corrective Measures") of the Directive, without prejudice to any damages due to the rightholder by reason of the infringement, and without compensation of any sort, Member States shall ensure that the competent judicial authorities may order, at the request of the applicant, that appropriate measures be taken with regard to goods that they have found to be infringing an intellectual property right and, in appropriate cases, with regard to materials and implements principally used in the creation or manufacture of those goods. Such measures shall include:
a) recall from channels of commerce,
b) definitive removal from the channels of commerce, or
c) destruction.
(22) According to paragraph (2) of Article 10 of the Directive, the judicial authorities shall order that those measures be carried out at the expense of the infringer, unless particular reasons are invoked for not doing so.
(23) According to paragraph (3) of Article 10 of the Directive, in considering a request for corrective measures, the need for proportionality between the seriousness of the infringement and the remedies ordered as well as the interests of third parties shall be taken into account.
(24) According to Article 11 ("Injunctions") of the Directive, member states shall ensure that, where a judicial decision is taken finding an infringement of an intellectual property right, the judicial authorities may issue against the infringer an injunction aimed at prohibiting the continuation of the infringement. Where provided for by national law, non-compliance with an injunction shall, where appropriate, be subject to a recurring penalty payment, with a view to ensuring compliance. Member states shall also ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe an intellectual property right, without prejudice to Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29/EC.
(25) It is obvious from the above citations that the provisions of Sec. 4 of the IP Rights Enforcement Act introduce both Article 10 and Article 11 of the Directive into Czech law. There is no substantial difference between the wording of the Act and the wording of the Directive. Therefore, in order to be able to answer the question whether the operator of a (physical rather than electronic) marketplace – i.e., more specifically, a person who rents out a marketplace and makes available stalls (and parcels of lands on which to erect stalls) to individual vendors – may be a person whose means or services are used by third parties to infringe intellectual property rights within the meaning of Sec. 4 (3) of the IP Rights Enforcement Act and whether measures may be imposed on such "marketplace operator" under Sec. 4 (1) of the cited Act, one must first determine the answer to the question whether such a "marketplace operator" (operating a "real" rather than an electronic marketplace) may qualify as an intermediary whose services are used by third persons to infringe intellectual property rights (and thus may be subjected to a court injunction) within the meaning of Article 11 of the Directive.
(26) In other words, this is an issue of interpretation of EU law. Pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU"), the Court of Justice of the European Union has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of the Treaties, (b), the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union.
(27) Pursuant to the third paragraph of the said Article, if such a question is raised in a case pending before a court of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice of the European Union.
(28) In terms of the obligation of courts of Member States whose decisions cannot be challenged by invoking judicial remedies under national law to refer to the Court of Justice with a request for a preliminary ruling, the decision of the Court of Justice of 6 October 1982 CILFIT is of key significance. In this decision, the Court of Justice stipulated three exemptions - situations in which the highest national courts do not have the said obligation. To wit:
1) The question concerning Community law (note: today, EU law) is not relevant for the outcome of the given case,
2) There exists case law of the Court of Justice on the relevant case, or a judgment of the Court of Justice concerning a question at issue which is essentially identical (this being known as acte éclairé),
3) The correct application of Community law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt (this is known as acte clair). For the court of a member state to be in a position that the application of Community law is obvious, it must (a) compare the different language versions of the letter of the law, (b) use the terminology and the legal concepts of Community law, (c) take into account the peculiarities of interpretation of Community law, (d) be convinced that the matter is equally obvious to the courts of the other member states and to the European Court of Justice.
(29) In the case at hand, the interpretation of EU law is relevant and the Court of Justice has not addressed the same or a similar question in the past. In its judgment of 12 July 2011 in C-324/09 L’Oréal and others v. e-Bay and others, the Court of Justice merely addressed a question regarding the application of measures pursuant to the third sentence of Article 11 of the Directive against the operator of an online marketplace; it did give no further consideration to the scope of the circle of persons affected by the definition of the intermediary whose services are used for the infringement of intellectual property rights. In so doing, the Court of Justice arrived at the conclusion that "the third sentence of Article 11 of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004, on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, must be interpreted as requiring the Member States to ensure that the national courts with jurisdiction in relation to the protection of intellectual property rights are able to order the operator of an online marketplace to take measures which contribute, not only to bringing to an end infringements of those rights by users of that marketplace, but also to preventing further infringements of that kind. Those injunctions must be effective, proportionate, dissuasive and must not create barriers to legitimate trade". Online market places operate based on principles that in part deviate from those for physical marketplaces - by their very nature, they are accessible solely via remote access, they allow one to purchase goods irrespective of their current physical presence in the internal market, the operators generate fund by charging a percentage of the value of completed transactions.
(30) Nor is the question at issue an acte clair, in the view of the Supreme Court. The analysis of the application of the Directive of 22 December 2010 has drawn attention, in Section 2.5.1.2 (which admittedly applies to Article 9 of the Directive; however, Section 2.5.2 extends the earlier conclusions so as to apply also the Article 11 of the Directive), to a certain degree of uncertainty when it comes to determining how broadly conceived the circle of intermediaries is against whom an injunction may be issued. Note No. 37 of this analysis states that e.g. Sweden limits the term "intermediary to "anyone who contributes to the infringement“. The Czech scholarly literature also does not perceive "intermediary" to be a concept as broad as the letter of the Directive would seem to suggest – "this does not include… any such person (such as the owner of premises, or of a stall in the case of sales at a stall); one must always assess whether there exists a direct connection between the use of such means and the infringement of rights. Sales of counterfeit goods at a rental stall, for instance, does not bring about such a direct connection (in that the goods may sold anywhere through a variety of sales channels) …" (HORÁCEK, Roman et al., "Zákon o ochranných známkách / Zákon o ochrane oznacení puvodu a zemepisných oznacení / Zákon o vymáhání práv z prumyslového vlastnictví" (Trademarks Act / Act on the Protection of the Designation of Origin and of Geographical Indications / Act on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights), 2nd ed., Prague: C. H. Beck, 2008, 543pp, ISBN 978-80-7400-058-4. p. 335).
(31) For this reason, it is not self-evident whether a person who rents out the premises of a market place and makes available stalls (and parcels of lands on which to erect stalls) to individual vendors, may be an intermediary whose services are being used by third parties for the infringement of intellectual property rights (and whether such a person could be the target of an injunction) within the meaning of Article 11 of the Directive. Given the fundamental importance of this issue for a decision on the merits, the Czech Supreme Court asks the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.
(32) Suppose the said entity is indeed an intermediary within the meaning of Article 11 of the Directive: the question arises then whether the conditions under which an injunction may be issued against the operator of an online market place (as set out in ECJ judgment of 12 July 2011, C-324/09 L’Oréal and others v e-Bay) also apply to a person who has rented out the premises of a physical market place and makes available stalls (and parcels of lands on which to erect stalls) to individual vendors. If the earlier question were to be answered in the affirmative, then this second question, too, would be of fundamental importance for a decision on the merits, which is why the Czech Supreme Court asks the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.
VI. Stay of proceedings
(33) Given that the Supreme Court resolved to ask the Court of Justice of the European Union on a preliminary ruling on a prejudicial question, it has stayed the proceedings in the matter, pursuant to Sec. 243c of the Code of Civil Procedure in conjunction with Sec. 109 (1) (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, until the Court of Justice of the European Union has accommodated the request, as the continuation of proceedings in the absence of such a ruling is impossible, especially since it is unclear whether or not the Defendant is an intermediary within the meaning of Article 11 of the Directive and whether an injunction within the meaning of the cited Article may be imposed on them.
No legal remedies are available against this resolution.
Brno, on 25 August 2015
JUDr. Zdeňek D e s , m.p. presiding justice
For accuracy: Marie Pezlarová